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Abstract: This paper uses a unique database of financial accounts for English football clubs 
between 1974 and 2010 to examine the process by which firms fail, which in this context means 
entering insolvency proceedings. From the data it is possible to estimate shocks to demand and 
productivity and to show that failing firms typically experience a series of negative shocks. This 
is consistent with the standard IO theory models of exit.  
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1. Introduction 
The reason that firms fail is an important question in management, business and economics. 
The standard economic view since (at least) the work of Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn 
(1992) is that the forces underlying firm failure and the decision to exit from a competitive 
industry are driven by random shocks. Empirical studies of bankruptcy and exit have focused on 
the characteristics of firms that fail and the effect on industry returns, innovation and product 
market competition. However, due to lack of data most previous studies have not modeled the 
competitive process among all the firms within an industry to identify the causes of failure of 
some of them. The contribution of this paper is to use market and financial data from a specific 
industry to model the process of competition and identify the “shocks” which affect firms; 
empirical estimates are derived and it is shown that these do indeed increase the probability of 
failure.  
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The industry is English professional football. It consists of around 100 competitors whose 
performance is measured weekly through the process of league competition. Outcomes are 
measured with perfect accuracy (teams win, lose or draw). Team revenues and investments 
(primarily in players) are a matter of public record. Failure is commonplace, and firms enter 
administration (the UK equivalent of Chapter XI) at officially recorded dates.  
In the paper the competitive process is modeled based on the relationship between (a) team 
performance (in terms of league position) and wage expenditures (mostly devoted to hiring 
playing talent) and (b) club revenues and team performance. This paper shows that failure can 
be identified with idiosyncratic shocks both to productivity (the wage-performance 
relationship) and to demand (the performance revenue-relationship). A shock in this sense is 
measured as the difference between the fitted values for each of these relationships and the 
realized values. The probability of failure increases significantly when firms experience a series 
of negative shocks. 
The paper also has relevance to policy debates within the football industry. In recent years 
concerns about financial failure have led to increased pressure for regulation of budgets, 
culminating in the Financial Fair Play rules introduced by the European governing body (UEFA) 
in 2009.   
The next section reviews the relevant literature. There follows a description of the organization 
of English football, the insolvency process in England and a simple model of insolvency. Section 
4 describes the data and the regression results, section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature  
The causes of business failure are of longstanding interest. In the 1980s economists started to 
develop optimizing models which could account for the observed patterns of exit from an 
industry- e.g. Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995). These models rely 
on the notion of idiosyncratic shocks which affect the firm’s perception of its true productivity. 
In this world, exit is rational once perceived productivity falls below some threshold value. 
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Estimation of structural models is challenging, but an early example is Olley and Pakes (1996) 
on telecommunications equipment and recent industry studies include Dunne et al (2013) 
(dentists and chiropractors) and Collard-Wexler (2013) (ready-mix concrete). This paper is 
related to this literature in that it estimates a structural model of competition using data on 
almost all firms in an industry to identify shocks that cause some firms to fail.  
There is also a large literature on the estimation of exit probabilities using reduced form models 
with both multi-industry datasets, e.g. Dunne et al (1988), Disney et al (2003), Honjo and 
Harada (2006), Esteve-Pérez et al (2010), Fackler et al (2013) Lee and Mukoyama (2015), and 
industry specific datasets, e.g. Airlines (Joskow et al (1994)) and grocery retailing (Hosken et al 
(2016)). The main findings are that the probability of exit tends to decrease with firm size and 
that the relationship between firm age and turnover is often U-shaped, with both very young 
and very old firms at higher risk than middle-aged firms. In general these studies are based on 
large scale industrial surveys, and while it is possible to group firms into broad industry 
categories (e.g. using the Standard Industrial Classification), in most cases it is not possible to 
identify all of the direct competitors among failing and non-failing firms.  
As Schary (1991) pointed out, exit can occur for many different reasons, including merger, 
voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy. In this paper “exit” takes the form of entry into the legal 
process of administration. Administration is a legal process in the UK which allows insolvent 
firms to reach an accommodation with creditors while allowing the business to survive. As a 
result, the shareholders typically see the value of the shares reduced to zero and new investors 
take control of the business (the process is explained in more detail in the next section). Hence 
while the business survives, the shareholders exit. 
There have been numerous studies of the causes of bankruptcy, e.g. Cuthbertson and Hudson 
(1996), Kovenock and Phillips (1997), Donker et al (2009), El Kalak and Hudson (2016).
1
                                                            
1
 There is also a literature on the ex post consequences of bankruptcy, e.g. Borenstein and Rose (2003), Ciliberto 
and Schenone (2012). 
 This 
research shows that bankruptcy is more likely when profitability is low and leverage is high. 
There is a long literature stretching back to Altman (1968) which uses accounting measures to 
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predict bankruptcies. Altman based his analysis on five well known accounting ratios –working 
capital/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, earnings before interest and taxes/total 
assets, sales/total assets and market value of equity/book value of total liabilities. The weight 
to attach to each of these ratios is derived by matching insolvent businesses with a sample of 
businesses with similar characteristics (e.g. size and industry). Such models have been widely 
used by practitioners to assess bankruptcy probabilities. In more recent times logit models have 
been developed (e.g. Ohlson (1980), Jones and Hensher (2004)).
2
The causes of bankruptcy have also been widely researched in the strategic management 
literature. This research tends to focus on case studies and generates more qualitative 
conclusions. For example Ooghe and De Prijcker (2007) develop a fourfold classification of 
bankruptcies- start-ups, (over)-ambitious growth, dazzled growth (extreme optimism and 
unrealistic perceptions) and apathetic management. Trahms et al (2013) review the literature 
on firm decline and turnaround focusing on managerial cognition, strategic leadership and 
stakeholder management. These are clearly more difficult concepts to quantify, but 
nonetheless can reasonably be considered likely to have an impact on outcomes. In the football 
industry it is commonplace to blame failure on poor leadership and especially over-ambitious 
growth plans and unrealistic perceptions. The influence of these factors is assessed below. 
 For the industry studied in 
this paper financial statements are available for almost of the businesses that compete in the 
market. Rather than rely only on balance sheet data (assets and liabilities) to predict failure, the 
approach in this paper is to identify idiosyncratic shocks arising from the competitive process to 
explain the deterioration of the balance sheet as a business approaches insolvency.    
 
                                                            
2
 One problem with these approaches is that the accounting variables are often not very informative, while the 
businesses themselves are heterogeneous, even within industry groups, and so predictive performance is not 
strong (see e.g. Ohlson pp124-130 and Peat and Jones (2012)). More recently attention has focused on whether 
information contained in share prices might not be a better predictor of insolvency, given that under the efficient 
market hypothesis the share price should contain all relevant information. Hillegeist et al (2004) show that an 
option pricing model can improve on the best alternative ratio-based indicator, but while the difference is 
statistically significant it does not appear large in absolute terms. 
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3. Insolvency in Professional football 
(a) Context 
Insolvency, meaning that the value of assets owned by a business is insufficient to cover its 
liabilities,
3
 is a chronic problem in the world of professional Association football (soccer), the 
world’s most popular sport. According to UEFA, 56% of European clubs participating at the 
highest level of national competition were loss-making in 2010 and 36% reported negative net 
equity (UEFA
 
(2012a)). Since 2013-14 the eligibility of a club to play in international UEFA 
competitions has been assessed in relation to minimum financial criteria, including a 
determination that it is a going concern, has no overdue payables and no negative equity (these 
regulations are known as Financial Fair Play (FFP, UEFA (2012b)). UEFA reported that 56% of 
clubs failed to meet at least one of these criteria in 2010. Nor is this a recent phenomenon; 
financial crises in football are frequent and well documented.
4
 
 
This paper examines cases of insolvency in English professional football from the early 1980s, 
when the first cases of the modern era arose, until 2010.
5
                                                            
3
 This “balance sheet definition” of insolvency should be distinguished from technical insolvency where the value 
of assets exceeds liabilities but in the short term the business does not have cash available to meet debt 
repayments. Technical insolvency can usually be dealt with by negotiation. 
 During this period the finances of 
clubs were unregulated and insolvency proceedings were commonplace in the lower divisions 
of English football: between 1982 and 2010 there were 67 cases of legal insolvency proceedings 
4
 See e.g. the symposium in the Journal of Sports Economics on the Financial Crisis in Europe, Lago et al. (2006), 
Szymanski and Smith (1997) and Jennett and Sloane (1985). A UK government report in 1968 revealed substantial 
losses among professional football clubs and commented “Ominously, clubs were in financial debt in inverse ratio 
to their likely capacity, in terms of playing success, to pay it off” (Department of Education and Science, p41). “If 
these clubs continue to incur losses at the present rate or at an increased rate, one must ask who will take 
responsibility for the accumulated deficits in, say, a decade’s time, or even less? Is it possible for them to remain in 
existence or will there be increasing insolvency?” Ibid, p45. 
5
 For a history of insolvency in football, both in England and elsewhere see Szymanski (2015), chapters 1 and 8.  
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among English clubs participating in the second, third and fourth tiers of English football.
6
Insolvency does not mean liquidation. All of the professional football clubs that became 
insolvent in our database still survive. Either new investors acquired the club and injected 
capital, or, in a small number of cases, the business was liquidated but the club was resurrected 
and the new legal entity took over the stadium. While insolvency does not mean liquidation of 
the football club, it does typically entail turnover of the management and ownership team. The 
next section explains how the interaction of English insolvency laws with the organization and 
culture of football have brought this situation about. 
 
Thirteen clubs experienced insolvency more than once over this period.  
 
Since 2010 a number of regulatory controls have been introduced. As well as UEFA’s FFP, the 
English leagues have adopted financial regulations: the top tier (the Premier League) adopted 
Short Term Cost Control measures in 2013, the second tier (The Championship) adopted Profit 
and Sustainability rules in 2012 (since merged with Premier League rules) and in 2011 the third 
and fourth tiers (League One and League Two) introduced sanctions for failure to comply with 
their Salary Cost Management Protocol).
7
The impact of these measures, notably FFP, on competition has been widely debated; for a 
positive view see Franck (2014), for a more jaundiced view see Szymanski (2014). While there is 
some theoretical analysis (e.g. Madden (2015) and Sass (2016)) as yet little empirical work has 
appeared. Peeters and Szymanski (2014) generate some predictions about the impact on wages 
using simulations based on the same database as used in this paper. Dimitropoulos (2016) finds 
  
                                                            
6
 Within this hierarchical structure the tiers are generally known as divisions, and the words will be used 
interchangeably here, but some care is required since the names of the divisions have changed over time. Hence 
the top division is now known as the Premier League but was formerly called the First Division; the Football League 
Championship (the second tier) was formerly known as the Second Division, and for a short while as the Football 
League Division One; the third tier has been called the Third Division, the Second Division, and is now Football 
League One; the fourth tier was known as the Fourth Division, then the Third Division, and now Football League 
Two. To avoid confusion I shall simply refer to each of these as the first, second, third and fourth tier/division. 
7
 For more details on the current regulatory structure see http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/.  
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some evidence that indebted clubs are less likely to choose high quality auditors following the 
introduction of FFP in order, he argues, to avoid sanctions. Scelles et al (2016) examined the 
pattern insolvency in French football over the period 1970 to 2014, although without financial 
accounting data, and found that clubs entered insolvency with roughly the same frequency, at 
the same levels, and for similar reasons as in England.  
 
(b) Insolvency law and English football 
Insolvency law
8
By the end of the 1990s there was a consensus that the 1986 Act was still failing to ensure that 
viable companies could be rescued from liquidation (see e.g. Review Group (2000)). In 
particular it was argued that it continued to be difficult for a company to negotiate a write-off 
with its creditors. Thus the 2002 Enterprise Act created greater incentives for negotiation and 
placed more power in the hands of company directors to reach a voluntary arrangement. 
 is complex and country specific. In English law a creditor can apply to a court to 
have the company wound up and its assets sold to repay creditors, usually under the temporary 
management of a professional insolvency practitioner (see e.g. Finch (2009), chapters 1 and 2). 
The purpose of the law is to protect creditors when a business is continuing to trade and incur 
liabilities while there is no realistic prospect of repayment. By the early 1980s it was widely 
perceived that the law gave undue power to certain creditors and too frequently provoked the 
winding up of companies that were in fact, given a reasonable settlement with creditors, 
capable of surviving as (profitable) going concerns (Cork (1982)). The Insolvency Act of 1986 
significantly altered the law and extended a process known as “administration”, whereby a 
company could place itself under the management of an insolvency practitioner whose job is to 
reach an agreement with creditors so that the business can survive (thus the legislation is akin 
to Chapter XI in US bankruptcy law).  
                                                            
8
 Under English law insolvency relates to corporations, bankruptcy to individuals. 
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Most of the insolvencies of English football clubs have involved either administration or a 
“company voluntary arrangement”.
9
 Whatever the perceived failings of insolvency law in the 
wider economy, football clubs have survived. Although there are 67 recorded cases of formal 
insolvency proceedings in the population between 1982 and 2010, 84
10
 of the clubs that 
participated in the four divisions in 1982 also did so in 2010, while all but two of the remaining 
clubs were relegated to play in fifth tier.
11
This unusual phenomenon arises from three special features of the industry. First, when a 
football club’s performance on the field deteriorates it loses support, but there is always a small 
number of diehards prepared to stand by the club, and thus at almost any level of play it can 
generate some income. Second, a club can always adjust its wage bill to its current status. 
While competition for talent is intense, there is also a large supply of players, and at the lower 
levels individuals are willing to play for almost nothing (usually in the hope of gaining 
recognition and playing at a higher level). Third, the principal asset of any club is usually its 
stadium. In an unrestricted market the value would reside almost entirely in the land which 
could profitably be converted to commercial or residential uses
 Even when the limited liability company that owned 
the football club has been liquidated, the football club has been taken over by a new limited 
liability company. But in most cases the company itself survives, having reaching a deal with its 
creditors.  
12
While the club survives, insolvency is often a signal that principal owners of the club have 
decided to exit. In many cases exit is forced, since the club requires an injection of capital that 
. However, local planning 
authorities seldom permit this to happen since they value the sense of community that a 
football club creates. Hence the only viable use of the assets of an insolvent football club is to 
continue operating as a football club. 
                                                            
9
 See also Beech et al (2010) for a description of insolvency in English football. 
10
One team, formerly Wimbledon, relocated to Milton Keynes and was renamed MK Dons. 
11
Newport County and Halifax Town were closed down before being (almost immediately) reformed by fans, and 
made to start at the bottom of the competitive pyramid. Aldershot were forced to resign from the league in 1992 
without completing their fixtures, but were later reformed. Maidstone United, whose insolvency occurred after 
they had resigned from the fourth tier, were reformed with a longer lag. 
12
 many stadia in England, having been built over a century ago, are located in prime sites in cities that have 
grown significantly. 
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the existing owners are unable to finance. In other cases owners simply tire of owning the club. 
While clubs are, in themselves, often not profitable, owners can obtain indirect financial 
benefits (e.g. because of the opportunity to promote related businesses) or simply enjoy the 
consumption benefits and celebrity status associated with control of a significant community 
asset.
13
Since the change in the law in 2002 the football authorities have become concerned that club 
owners are using the insolvency laws to write-off debt and obtain a competitive advantage. 
With the help of a friendly administrator a club can pressure creditors to agree to write-off 
most of what they are owed, allowing the club to emerge from administration as a more 
competitive entity. Since 2005 the football authorities have applied a sporting penalty for 
entering administration in the form of a deduction of points in the season following the start 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
Given these peculiar features, it might be wondered how clubs obtain access to credit in the 
first place. Insolvencies have become relatively frequent but the sums of money involved are 
relatively small. In 2009/10 the total revenue across the four divisions totaled £2.5 billion, but 
the average turnover of clubs in the second tier was only £19 million, £9 million in the third tier 
and £3 million in the fourth. Clubs frequently obtain overdrafts from a local bank, and in most 
years clubs are able to service these loans. The largest creditor is usually the tax authority 
(owed payroll taxes and VAT). Since by law these taxes are paid in arrears, the tax authority 
cannot avoid becoming a creditor. In most cases it is the tax authority that starts insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
(c) Insolvency in the context of the market 
 
                                                            
13
 See Zimbalist (2003) for a discussion of ownership motives in the context of football and also American 
professional sport. 
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Since 1958 English professional football clubs have been organized into four hierarchical 
divisions consisting of 92 clubs in total, connected through the system of promotion and 
relegation on sporting merit. The divisions are of roughly equal size
14
The markets in which the clubs operate, for players and for supporters, are highly competitive. 
In the player market there are large numbers of buyers and sellers and player capabilities are 
well known. The search for talent is a vigorous, global process and the top players move 
relatively freely across national borders. Clubs generate revenues from game day (ticket sales, 
food and beverage, etc), TV revenues, merchandising and sponsorship. While local fan loyalty 
can be passionate, team performance is a significant determinant of revenues. Most broadcast 
revenue is generated at the highest tier (which also tends to make the highest tier the most 
financially stable), and attendance is significantly affected by the tier in which a team plays.  
 and once relegations are 
included around 120 clubs that have participated in the professional leagues since 1958.  
The intensity of competition is greatly enhanced by the system of promotion and relegation,
 15
 
through which a number of the worst performing teams in a given tier are automatically sent 
down to play in the next lower tier at the end of the season, to be replaced by the best 
performing teams in the lower tier. Between 1974 and 2010 a team promoted from the second 
tier to the top tier enjoyed on average a 24% increase in attendance, while a relegated team 
saw attendance drop by 16%.
16
                                                            
14
 There have been a number of minor reorganizations over the years- the top division currently consists of 20 
clubs and the three lower divisions 24 each. Currently, each season there are three promotions/relegations 
to/from the top two divisions (The FA Premier League and the Football League Championship), four 
relegations/promotions from/to the third division (The Football League One) and two relegations from the fourth 
level (Football League Two) to the fifth level.   
 Merchandising and sponsorship revenues are highly correlated 
with the level of fan interest in a club. Thus while each division contains only 20 or so clubs, the 
15
 This system is almost universal in the football world, but unknown in the professional major leagues of North 
America 
16
 Promotion from 3
rd
 to second raised attendance by 17% on average, and from 4
th
 to third by 6%. Relegation 
from 2
nd
 to 3
rd
 tier reduced attendance by 12% on average and from 3
rd
 to 4
th
 by 3%.  
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threat of relegation hangs over an underperforming club during the season. The intensity of 
competition affects teams at all levels despite the fact that some clubs have enjoyed fairly 
consistent success. All but three clubs between 1974 and 2010 have spent time in at least two 
divisions (and so have been promoted or relegated at least once) and 21 clubs spent time in all 
four divisions.
17
  
  
(d) Modeling insolvency in English football 
Most panel data studies of firm failure/exit adopt a reduced form approach where the 
likelihood of failure is attributed to plausible exogenous variables. In this paper a structural 
model of competition is developed to identify deviations, labeled shocks, from expected 
performance which then contribute to the likelihood of failure. The process can be simply 
described. Clubs spend resources, primarily in the form of player wages, in the pursuit of 
sporting success (supply) which then generate revenues through ticket sales, merchandising 
and broadcast income (demand). Given that there exists a large and relatively transparent 
market for playing talent and a reliable relationship between success and fan interest, it is 
possible to model these relationships with a good degree of precision (and the participating 
clubs can be assumed to have a good understanding of these relationships). However, there can 
be negative productivity shocks to the wage-performance relationship or negative demand 
shocks to the performance-revenue relationship.  
It is natural to associate random shocks with good and bad luck. According to the well-known 
“uncertainty of outcome hypothesis” advanced by Rottenberg (1956), some randomness is 
essential to sporting competition in order for it to be attractive to viewers. Because football is a 
low scoring game, outcomes are especially susceptible to random events.
18
                                                            
17
 The three clubs are Arsenal, Everton and Liverpool. Everton finished one place above relegation on three 
occasions in the data. 
 Obvious sources of 
18
 For example, in basketball there are typically between 50 and 100 scoring events in a game; if scoring 
opportunities are proportional to ability then it is very unlikely that a team of significantly less able players will win. 
By contrast most football matches are decided by a single goal and teams may have only a handful of scoring 
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bad fortune in the wage-performance relationship are injuries or loss of form by star players. 
An example of a negative shock to the performance-revenue relationship was the unexpected 
collapse of the ITV Digital broadcast contract
19
Shocks in this sense will have financial implications that will appear in the short term as 
financial losses (or lower than expected profits), which then undermine the balance sheet by 
leading to increased borrowing or short term sale of assets. A series of negative shocks could 
thus stretch the balance sheet to the point where the value of assets is no longer sufficient to 
cover liabilities and the club is required to declare itself insolvent. 
 in March 2002, involving a loss equivalent to 
about 10-20% of annual income for the clubs affected. Within one year 12 clubs entered 
insolvency proceedings. This shock affected many clubs simultaneously, but negative shocks to 
demand can occur which are idiosyncratic; for example, a local economic downturn can reduce 
demand for attendance at home games of a particular club. 
The simple model of Szymanski and Smith (1997) can be adapted to focus on the issue of 
insolvency.
20
                                                                                                                                                                                               
opportunities in a game, making the game more susceptible to chance. For a good discussion of this issue see 
Groot (2008). 
 That paper estimated two relationships, now well established in the football 
finance literature. Firstly, because the market for players is highly competitive league 
performance is highly correlated with player wage spending (see e.g. Hall et al (2002), Simmons 
19
 Properly speaking, what was unexpected was that the Football League, which signed the contract on behalf of 
the clubs, had failed to ensure that the wealthy parent companies of ITV Digital had signed the guarantees which 
they had agreed to provide, rendering the guarantees unenforceable (see Szymanski (2015), pp78-80 for details). 
20
 Two papers have used data to analyse financial distress of football clubs. Barajas and Rodriguez (2010) used 
accounting data to test for the probability of insolvency for Spanish football clubs. They found that accounting 
measures similar to those used in the mainstream literature had no significant effect (although they questioned 
the reliability of the accounting data), while presence in the top division significantly reduced the probability of 
insolvency. Leach (2006), who uses a similar methodology to the one that will be adopted here, looked at the same 
population of football clubs over eleven seasons between 1990 and 2001. She estimated the relationships (1)’ and 
(2)’ below in error correction form and then used the residuals from these equations to explain (a) company credit 
ratings and (b) financial distress, in the form of adverse comments by the auditors in the company report and 
accounts. She found that negative residuals (meaning either a worse than expected league position conditional on 
wage expenditure, or lower than expected revenues conditional on league position) had a statistically significant 
adverse effect on credit ratings and raised the probability of adverse audit opinions. 
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and Forrest (2002, 2004), Torgler and Schmidt (2007), Carmichael et al (2010)). Hence we can 
write  
(1) P i = a + b 
��∑ ��  + ε i
Where P
,  a,b> 0 
i is league rank, which runs from 1 to 92 in the case of English professional football, w 
are wages and 
��∑ ��  is the Tullock contest success function – money buys talent and talent 
produces success
21
 (for an analysis of contest theory and sports leagues see Szymanski (2003)) 
and ε i
The second relationship is between club revenues and league position- more successful clubs 
generate larger revenues, which is, ceteris paribus, equivalent to saying that demand is 
increasing in the quality of the home team (see e.g. Dobson and Goddard (2011), Buraimo et al 
(2007), Cox (2012)).
 is a random productivity shock.  
 22
(2) R(P
 This can be written as 
i) = c + dP i + η i
Where η
 , c, d> 0 
i
(3) π
 is a random demand shock. Profit is simply (2)-(1): 
i = R(P i) - w
Ever since the work of Sloane (1971) it has been a widespread view among academics that 
football clubs in Europe are not profit maximisers (unlike North American sports franchises), 
i 
                                                            
21
 In addition to wages, clubs often pay a transfer fee to acquire a player from another club, theoretically as a 
compensation for contractual services foregone. In most cases this does not amount to a substantial sum of 
money, but in a small number of cases it can amount to tens of millions of pounds. The transfer fee for each player 
is not identified, and hence a plausible amortization schedule cannot be derived. However, Szymanski (2013) based 
on research relating to reported Premier League transfer fees of players between 1992 and 2010, found that 
wages and transfer fees of players currently on a team roster, adjusted for aggregate transfer fee inflation, had a 
correlation coefficient with club wage bills of around +0.87. 
22
 Clubs typically play around 40 games per season in league competition (half of them at their home ground). In 
addition they play some revenue generating games in domestic knock-out cup competitions and in international 
competitions such as the Champions League. These sources of revenue are included in the financial statements 
used in the estimating model applied in the next section, while the league performance of the team tends to be 
highly correlated with success in those other competitions.  
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but rather win maximisers (Késenne (1996)), so that all available income is spent on playing 
talent. “Available” here may also entail a soft budget constraint (see Andreff (2007) and Storm 
(2012)). Thus the objective of the owner can be written as  
(4) Max Ω i = απ i + (1 – α) P i  subject to π i 
where k may be negative if the club faces a soft budget constraint. Assuming that the 
expectations of the random shocks are zero, then the symmetric Nash equilibrium when α = 1 is  
≥ k   
(5) w = bd(n-1)/n
where n is the number of clubs and expected profits are 
2
 
(6) π i = ad + c + bd/n2 + dε i + η
For large n this expected profit is positive and equal to ad + c > 0.  
i 
For 0 < α < 1 
(7) w = (n-1)/n2
so that ∂w/∂α < 0. Thus as α decreases (the owner places a greater emphasis on winning) 
 (αbd + 1 – α)/α 
• wage spending increases, even though in the symmetric equilibrium the expected 
league position is constant and equal to 1/n • The profits of the firm are driven down and may no longer be positive • Even if profits are above zero in expectation, a random shock (i.e. negative realizations 
of ε i or η i
From (6) it is clear that profitability is driven by random shocks to demand (η
) may be sufficient to generate short term economic losses. 
i) and to 
productivity (ε i
 
) which can push profits below the budget constraint threshold k. at this point 
insolvency and exit may occur. 
4. Data, regression model and results 
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(a) Descriptive statistics 
English football clubs are limited liability companies (most have been so since the early 20
th
In each season this amounts to a total of 92 clubs, but due to promotion and relegation from 
the fourth tier the database includes 109 clubs. Two thirds of the teams were present in all 37 
seasons, and only 12 clubs were present for fewer than 10 seasons. Given that the league 
position is known for every team, the data represents the entire population (3404 club seasons) 
rather than a sample. The financial information was obtained from Companies House.
 
century). Under English law all limited liability companies have to publish annual accounts 
available for public inspection. Moreover, the date on which a limited company enters 
insolvency proceedings is also a matter of public record. The data used in this paper covers the 
four professional divisions of English league football over 37 seasons from 1973/74 to 2009/10. 
23
 Data 
for revenues, aggregate club wage spending, pre-tax profits and balance sheet data on assets 
and liabilities can be extracted from the accounts. The data includes a full set of accounting 
information for 87% of the 3404 club seasons, plus abbreviated accounts
24
Figure 1 shows the trend in real (inflation adjusted) average club income by division from 1974 
to 2010. The aggregate revenues of clubs in the top division have grown at 9.3% per year on 
average for 37 years, a 24-fold increase in real terms. This is an extraordinary rate of growth 
over such an extended period of time. While real growth rates have been less spectacular in the 
lower divisions, they have still been well in excess of the average real growth rates recorded by 
the UK economy over the period. At the aggregate divisional level revenue growth rates are not 
volatile and while negative in some years, in percentage terms declines are generally small. 
 for a further 8%, 
leaving only 5% of club years for which there is no accounting information. 
Figure 1 here 
                                                            
23
 financial information can be downloaded from this website 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house and all records back to around 2000 are now 
freely available. Earlier data can be obtained for a small charge; data from 1974 to around 2000 is supplied on a 
CD-rom and prior to 1974 they provide paper copies. 
24
 Companies whose annual revenue falls below a certain threshold are not required to provide a full set of 
accounts. 
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Despite this rapid rate of growth, clubs have rarely managed to generate significant profits, as 
shown in figure 2. In each division total reported profits are seldom above zero. Given that 
profitability data is available for only 85% of the population and that financial accounts are 
often not available during insolvency, figure 2 probably overstates the average level of 
profitability. While some individual clubs may have sustained profits over some years, on 
average few do better than breakeven, and many do substantially worse. 
Figure 2 here 
The proximate cause of this financial weakness is evident in Figure 3. In the 1970s average team 
wage spending as a percentage of revenue was less than 50% in the top tier and 70% in the 
fourth tier. Despite the astonishing increases in revenues, the percentage of revenues devoted 
to wages has increased in all the divisions, particularly in the last decade and a half. From this 
perspective, the increase in insolvencies is perhaps not so surprising. 
Figure 3 here. 
The estimation in this paper will focus on the 48 cases where clubs became insolvent for the 
first time. There are thirteen clubs that experienced insolvency more than once but the 
accounting records for these repeat offenders are patchy rendering inference problematic. 
Figure 4 shows the average league position of the 48 clubs that entered insolvency proceedings 
(for the first time) since 1982, from 10 years before the event to 6 years after the event. League 
rank is treated as if continuous across divisions, so that top of the Premier League is 1, bottom 
of the Premier League is 20, top the Football League Championship is 21, and so on down to 92. 
The average rank for insolvent clubs lies between rank 45 (which is the highest rank of the third 
tier and rank 68, which is the lowest rank of the third tier). 
The chart shows that in the five years prior to insolvency league rank declines from an average 
of 47 to 63 (16 places, a drop which almost inevitably entails relegation), while in the five years 
before that the average league rank is stable between 47 and 49.  
Figure 4 here 
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Figure 4 also shows that by around six years after the insolvency event average league rank has 
risen by eleven places from the post insolvency trough, reaching the same position as two years 
before insolvency. 
Table 1 further illustrates the pattern of decline into insolvency. Panel (a) shows the percentage 
of the previous ten seasons that insolvent clubs had spent in each of the divisions. There were 
no clubs in the top tier at the date of their first insolvency.
25
Table 1 here 
 The clubs that went into insolvency 
while in the second tier had on average spent 48% of the previous ten seasons in the same tier, 
47% in the top tier and only 5% of their time in the third tier. A similar pattern emerges for 
teams that became insolvent while in the third or the fourth tier. Clubs that became insolvent 
had spent more of the previous decade in higher tiers than lower ones, suggesting that 
insolvency was associated with a trend of declining league performance. 
For comparison, panel (b) shows the how all of the clubs in each division in 2010 were spread 
across the divisions in the previous decade. In the second tier teams had spent more time in the 
lower tiers than the top tier, while in the third tier they had spent approximately the same 
amount of time in higher and lower tiers. In the fourth tier teams had spent more time in 
higher tiers, but to a lesser degree than was the case for insolvent clubs. 
 
(b) Regression analysis 
This evidence suggests that insolvency is primarily a consequence of relative decline. However, 
to make this more specific a regression model is helpful. The approach adopted here is to 
estimate the wage-performance relationship (analogous to (1)) and the revenue – performance 
relationship (analogous to (2)) at the first stage and then at the second stage use the estimated 
residuals to infer the likelihood of insolvency. 
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 Portsmouth, the only team to enter insolvency while in the Premier League (in 2010), had already been through 
an administration process in 1999 while in the second tier.. 
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Stage 1: estimation of the wage-performance and revenue-performance relationships 
The measure of performance based on league position (as discussed above) is transformed to 
the negative of the log odds of league rank, lnp = (-ln(P/(93-P)) where P is the rank of the team 
in the league hierarchy (from 1 to 92).
26
(1’)  ∆lnp
 The measure of team revenue is the log of club 
revenue in a given season relative to the sum of league revenues in the season (lnrelrev), which 
eliminates the inflationary trend evident in figure 1. Nonetheless, Fisher panel unit root tests 
strongly rejected that these variables have unit roots, and therefore an error correction 
framework was adopted, following Leach (2006). Thus the empirical counterpart to equation (1) 
is defined as: 
it = β i + βt + β1lnpit-1 + β2∆lnp it-1 + β3lnrelwit + β4∆lnrelwit-1 + promotion/relegation 
dummies + division/tier dummies + wage/tier interactions + ε
In addition to the inclusion of relative wage spending (from the financial accounts), as 
suggested by (1), the estimating equation (1’) includes lagged position, dummies for promotion 
and relegation (given the large adjustments involved in divisional movements), divisional 
dummies and the interaction of these dummies with wage spending, allowing for different 
wage-performance sensitivities in different tiers. Club and year fixed effects are also included. 
The empirical counterpart of equation (2) is defined as: 
it 
(2’)  ∆lnrelrev it = γi + γt + γ1lnrelrev it-1 + γ2∆lnrelrev it-1 + γ3lnp it + γ4∆lnp it-1 + 
promotion/relegation dummies + top 5 dummies + division/tier dummies + revenue/tier 
interactions + η
As well as including the impact of league performance (lnp) on revenues as suggested by 
equation (2), the estimating equation (2’) includes promotion and relegation dummies, a 
dummy for teams in the top 5 (awarding access to lucrative European competitions), divisional 
it 
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 Szymanski and Smith (1997) found that the log odds formulation worked well in estimation and this formulation 
has subsequently been adopted by other researchers (e.g. Buraimo et al (2007)). 
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dummies and interactions between revenues and tier, allowing that the sensitivity of revenues 
to performance may differ by tier. Club and year fixed effects are also included. 
The main purpose of the regressions is to estimate the errors, which are interpreted as shocks. 
A negative residual from equation (1’) implies that the club achieved a lower league position 
than it might have expected at the start of the season given the amount it was willing to spend 
on player wages. Given a lower than expected league position, this would in turn imply that the 
club generated a lower level of revenue than it would have expected at the start of the season. 
A negative residual from (2’) implies that a club generated lower revenues than it might 
reasonably have expected given its league position. In both cases a negative residual implies 
financial stress. Over time, if these residuals are truly random, then they produce some better 
than expected years, some worse than expected years, and in the long run these effects will 
cancel out. However, in the short term a sequence of negative shocks could put significant 
pressure on the balance sheet of the club and hence precipitate insolvency. 
Tables 2 and 3 report the OLS estimates of (1’) and (2’). Standard errors are clustered around 
each club. Table 2 reports three variants of the estimating equation (1’), the first including 
position variables, the second adding relative wages and the third adding club and year 
effects.
27
Tables 2 and 3 here 
 The residuals from (1’) for the next stage are taken from the third variant. Table 3 
reports three variants  of the estimating equation (2’); the second version allows for league 
rank to interact differently with revenues in different divisions, while the third includes club and 
year effects. The residuals from (2’) for the next stage are taken from the third variant.   
If the relationships in Tables 2 and 3 can be interpreted as causal then the implied long run 
elasticity of league position (lnp) to relative wage spending is around 0.8 and the elasticity of 
revenues to league position is around 0.5. Both of these estimates are significant at the 1% 
level and in line with the theory. These estimates could be biased due to problems of omitted 
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 The wage/tier interaction terms were dropped from (1’) as these were not highly significant. 
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
variables
28
 
 or reverse causality, an issue addressed in this context by Hall et al (2002) and 
Simmons and Walker (2010). However, since we are using (1') and (2') to obtain best linear 
unbiased predictors of position and revenue in order to estimate the shocks to be employed in 
stage 2 of the analysis, we do not need to assume the exogeneity of the right hand side 
variables. The prediction is conservative in that the estimate of expected rank, for example, 
from (1') will pick up not only the effect of relative wages, but the effect of any omitted variable 
correlated with relative wages. Thus the residual only measures elements orthogonal to the 
included regressors, as is appropriate for the unexpected component.  
Stage 2: Using the residuals from (1’) and (2’) to infer the probability of insolvency 
The main focus of interest here is the residuals from (1’) and (2’). Figure 5 is a plot of the  
kernel densities from (1’) and (2’). While both plots appear normal, both fail a 
skewness-kurtosis test for normality; this appears to be because of some large outliers (fat 
tails). To check the robustness of the results, (1’) and (2’) were re-estimated using least 
absolute deviations (LAD) which does not require the assumption of normality, and these 
regression results are available on request from the author. The estimated coefficients from the 
regressions are very similar and results are not changed significantly.   
Figure 5 here 
The residuals from (1’) and (2’) are now used as regressors in a probit regression for the 
probability of entering insolvency proceedings. As well as the residuals, the regression includes 
divisional dummies, balance sheet ratios (the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and the ratio 
of net debt to revenues) and a dummy for the year 2002 (the ITV Digital collapse discussed in 
footnote 20 above which was a common shock to Football League clubs). The results are 
reported in Table 4.  
Table 4 here 
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 A Ramsey Reset test rejected the hypothesis of omitted variables in equation (1’) but not in (2’). 
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It is not surprising to find that the divisional dummies are highly significant given the absence in 
the data of any club from the Premier League entering insolvency.
29
It was argued above that the cumulative effect of negative shocks may increase the likelihood 
of insolvency. Thus column 1 of Table 4 reports the coefficients for the sum of residuals from 
time t and t -1 for (1’) and (2’) respectively, column 2 reports the coefficients for the sum of 
residuals from time t to t-2, column 3 reports the coefficients for the sum of residuals from time 
t to t-3 and column 4 reports the coefficients for the sum of residuals from time t to t-4. The 
table also reports the joint significance of the residuals from (1’) and (2’). 
 While competition is 
intense in all of the league tiers, the top tier benefits from significantly higher revenues and is 
hence less prone to insolvency. Likewise, the significance of the 2002 dummy is unsurprising 
given the number of clubs that became insolvent following the ITV Digital collapse. The ratio of 
liabilities to assets on the balance sheet is also highly significant, while the net debt to revenue 
ratio is positively correlated with the insolvency probability but is not consistently significant. 
All of the residuals have the correct sign – the larger the cumulative negative shocks the higher 
the probability of insolvency. In all four columns the shocks from the investment-performance 
regression (1’) are all statistically significant at conventional levels. Shocks from the revenue – 
performance regression (2’) are not generally significant despite being of similar magnitude to 
the shocks from (1’). However, all the residuals are jointly significant. Column 2, which uses 
current and two lags of the residuals has the highest pseudo-R
2
, the largest values of the 
coefficients on the residuals and the highest level of joint significance.
30
A further mechanism by which the residuals from (1’) and (2’) may trigger insolvency is 
explored in the next two tables. It was shown in Table 4 that insolvency is more likely when the 
ratio of liabilities to assets increases. One way for this to happen is as follows. If a team 
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 Portsmouth entered insolvency in 2010 while the Premier League but financial account for this season were not 
available and so they are not in the data 
30
 One problem with using longer lags is that there is considerable attrition in the data- 16% of observations are 
lost in moving from column 1 to column 4 of Table 4. In the version based on estimation of (1’) and (2’) using LAD 
(not reported here but available on request from the author) only the residuals in columns 1 and 2 are jointly 
significant. 
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underperforms on the field (1’) or fails to generate as much revenue as expected from 
performance (2’) then there may be a tendency for the ratio of wages to turnover to rise. This 
in turn will increase the likelihood that the team will have to borrow, causing the balance sheet 
to deteriorate. However, if the club perceives this simply to be a consequence of a negative 
shock, it may attempt to maintain a high level of spending in the (rational) expectation that 
performance will improve. A further negative shock will cause a further deterioration in 
finances. Repeating this process a number of times will weaken the balance sheet and so 
increase the probability of insolvency. 
Table 5 reports the relationship between the wage/turnover ratio and the residuals from (1’) 
and (2’), using the same presentation as in Table 4. The divisional dummies are highly 
significant, meaning that the wage turnover ratio tends to be larger in lower divisions (this was 
illustrated by figure 4). Table 5 also shows that negative residuals have a positive impact on the 
wage/turnover ratio. These residuals are highly significant for all cumulative lag lengths, 
suggesting that negative shocks have a tendency to increase financial pressure on a club.  
Table 5 here 
Table 6 examines the relationship between the wage/turnover ratio (which comes from the 
profit and loss account) and two balance sheet ratios- total liabilities/total assets and net 
debt/revenue. It appears that there is a fairly predictable relationship: a higher wage/turnover 
ratio leads to a statistically significant deterioration in the balance sheet.   
Table 6 here 
To conclude the empirical section, a set of regressions (not reported here but available on 
request) were estimated to identify any negative impacts on performance post insolvency. As 
the evidence of figure 4 might lead one to expect, there is no evidence that an insolvency event 
has any long lasting effect, in the sense that the post-insolvency clubs face the same trade-offs 
as other clubs as identified in (1’) and (2’), while the relationship between the profit and loss 
account and the balance sheet also seems unimpaired. One is left with the impression that 
negative shocks provoke insolvency, which leads to a company restructuring and a writing-off 
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of debts, which returns the club to its former good health, albeit typically under new ownership 
and control. 
The results of this paper show that: 
(i) There exists a relatively stable and predictable relationship between (a) player 
investment and team performance (Table 2) and (b) team performance and revenue 
(Table 3). 
(ii) In the run up to entering insolvency, clubs on average experience a sharp decline in 
league performance over a five year period, following a period of relative stability 
(Figure 1). 
(iii) Insolvency is a common event in the lower divisions where revenue generation is 
much lower than in the top division; only one club ever became insolvent while 
playing in the top division (Table 1) 
(iv) The probability of becoming insolvent increases the greater the negative residuals 
from the estimated relationships described in (i), and in particular when these 
negative residuals are realized in successive seasons (Table 4) 
(v) A series of negative residuals tends to be associated with a rising wage/revenue 
ratio, which is likely to stress the balance sheet (Tables 5 and 6). 
 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that insolvency has more to do with a crisis of 
performance than lack of discipline or irrationality. In any one season a team may 
underperform for reasons that are not predictable, and this creates a financial stress. Repeated 
negative shocks intensify the stress, and this can lead to insolvency. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The process by which firms exit from markets has been a subject of great interest in the 
literature. In the standard model of the theoretical literature random shocks (to demand 
and/or productivity) can push firms over the edge. These shocks emerge from a competitive 
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process among all the firms in an industry, even though only some fail. This paper uses a unique 
dataset comprising of almost all the firms of an industry to identify the shocks to demand and 
productivity which drive some firms into insolvency. 
 
These results are of more than merely theoretical interest. There is a perception that insolvency 
in football is driven by excessive profligacy, clubs living beyond their means, a kind of irrational 
exuberance. This view has been endorsed by the European governing body, UEFA, which in 
2009 introduced a form of financial regulation for clubs, called Financial Fair Play (FFP). The 
pre-amble to FFP Regulations claims that they will, inter alia, “introduce more discipline and 
rationality in club football finances” (UEFA (2012b), p2). On this view, clubs behave 
irresponsibly by spending beyond their means, generating excessive debt in the pursuit of 
success, leading ultimately to insolvency.  
 
The results of this paper suggest a different story. Clubs exist in a hyper-competitive 
environment due to the incentives of the promotion and relegation system. In a competitive 
environment firms generate negligible profits and are always close to insolvency. A sequence of 
negative shocks can drive a club over the edge, no matter how rational or disciplined the 
owners. 
It can be argued that many clubs suffer slumps in performance and not all become insolvent – 
there may be management failures involved in failing to adjust to declining performance, even 
indiscipline and irrationality. However, adjustment strategies to negative shocks are difficult to 
implement. The intense competitive pressures in professional league football means that any 
cut in wage expenditure in order to reduce costs is likely to lead to a deterioration in league 
performance which can in turn lead to relegation and a further collapse in revenue (for 
example, in 5% of relegations in the data the club was relegated by two divisions in successive 
seasons).  
 
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
The regulatory measures adopted by UEFA and by the English leagues (see section 3(a) above) 
are intended to reduce the incidence of insolvency. In their 2016 Annual Review of Football 
Finance, the accountants Deloitte reported that no English league clubs had entered insolvency 
proceedings since 2013. Whether this trend continues and whether it can be attributed to 
regulation remains an important topic for future research.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average real revenue growth by division 
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Figure 2: Profitability 
 
Figure 3: Wage bill as a percentage of revenue by division 
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Figure 4: Average League Rank before and after insolvency 
Note: number of observations from t-10 to 0 ranges from 48 to 45 and falls to 38 by t+6. 
 
  
(a) position – wage regression (1’)  (b)  revenue - position regression (2’) 
Figure 5: Kernel density estimates of the residuals from (1’) and (2’)  
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Table 1: Movement of teams between divisions 
 
 
Panel (a) 10 year history of teams before year of entering insolvency 
 
 fraction of club years in division over previous decade 
division at date of 
insolvency 1 2 3 4 lower n 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
2 47% 48% 5% 0% 0% 120 
3 10% 30% 33% 24% 4% 210 
4 0% 5% 32% 59% 5% 150 
 
Panel (b) 10 year history of all clubs in the four divisions in 2010 
 
fraction of club years in division over previous decade 
Division in 2010 1 2 3 4 lower n 
1 68% 26% 5% 3% 0% 200 
2 18% 49% 23% 8% 2% 240 
3 8% 20% 43% 23% 6% 240 
4 1% 8% 23% 46% 23% 240 
 
 
 
Table 2: League rank and wage spending (dependent variable is Δlnp) 
 
 
 
Rank only Rank and 
wages 
Fixed effects 
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Lnp (t-1) -0.399*** -0.426*** -0.685*** 
 (0.0634) (0.0599) (0.0469) 
∆ Lnp (t-1) -0.147*** -0.167*** -0.0518 
 (0.0421) (0.0388) (0.0313) 
Promotion (t) 0.426*** 0.413*** 0.244*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0666) (0.0555) 
Promotion (t-1) 0.0337 0.0625 0.0464 
 (0.0401) (0.0393) (0.0357) 
Relegation (t) -0.462*** -0.462*** -0.255*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0721) (0.0536) 
Relegation (t-1) -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.0617 
 (0.0425) (0.0435) (0.0379) 
Second tier -0.616*** -0.426*** -0.600*** 
 (0.0833) (0.0851) (0.0730) 
Third tier -1.033*** -0.705*** -1.080*** 
 (0.148) (0.152) (0.119) 
Fourth tier -1.735*** -1.324*** -1.974*** 
 (0.252) (0.248) (0.184) 
ln(Wage/Σ92
 
wages) (t-1) 0.226*** 0.224*** 
 
 (0.0274) (0.0462) 
∆ln(Wage/Σ92
 
wages) (t) 0.659*** 0.670*** 
 
 (0.0527) (0.0573) 
Constant 0.870*** 1.750*** 1.900*** 
 (0.116) (0.149) (0.232) 
 
   
Observations 3,162 2,609 2,609 
R-squared 0.357 0.417 0.491 
Number of clubs   98 
 
   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Revenue and league rank (dependent variable is ∆ln(Rev/Σ92
 
Rev) (t)) 
Revenue and 
league rank 
Revenue and 
league rank 
with rank/tier 
interactions 
Revenue and 
league rank 
with fixed 
effects 
    
ln(Rev/Σ92 -0.145*** Rev) (t-1) -0.148*** -0.270*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0215) 
∆ln(Rev/Σ92 -0.236*** Rev) (t-1) -0.243*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0231) 
Lnp (t-1) 0.119*** 0.0367 0.0678 
 (0.0158) (0.0246) (0.0443) 
∆ Lnp (t) 0.120*** 0.0782*** 0.0848*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0223) (0.0307) 
Top 5 rank (t) -0.109*** -0.0303 -0.0359 
 (0.0368) (0.0389) (0.0515) 
Top 5 rank (t-1) 0.0675** 0.152*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0436) (0.0471) 
Promotion (t) 0.267*** 0.298*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0248) (0.0247) 
Promotion (t-1) 0.0482** 0.0485** 0.0420** 
 (0.0197) (0.0189) (0.0187) 
Relegation (t) -0.146*** -0.190*** -0.175*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0234) 
Relegation (t-1) -0.0540*** -0.0612*** -0.0480** 
 (0.0199) (0.0195) (0.0185) 
Second tier -0.0904*** -0.320*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0525) (0.0814) 
Third tier -0.0769* -0.0742 -0.0981 
 (0.0419) (0.0558) (0.0855) 
Fourth tier 0.130** -0.0560 -0.109 
 (0.0639) (0.0616) (0.0891) 
Lnp (t-1) x T2  0.220*** 0.209*** 
  (0.0406) (0.0526) 
∆ Lnp (t) x T2  0.148*** 0.131*** 
  (0.0426) (0.0450) 
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Lnp (t-1) x T3  0.411*** 0.388*** 
  (0.0453) (0.0550) 
∆ Lnp (t) x T3  0.246*** 0.235*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0436) 
Lnp (t-1) x T4  0.0614** 0.0296 
  (0.0282) (0.0463) 
∆ Lnp (t) x T4  0.00404 -0.00896 
  (0.0271) (0.0341) 
Constant -0.749*** -0.621*** -1.244*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0730) (0.148) 
    
Observations 2,652 2,652 2,652 
R-squared 0.294 0.319 0.398 
Number of clubs   98 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 4: Dependent variable: Insolvency Event (probit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
Second tier 3.929*** 4.062*** 3.879*** 3.890*** 
 (0.342) (0.355) (0.355) (0.390) 
Third tier 4.170*** 4.324*** 4.233*** 4.164*** 
 (0.279) (0.291) (0.328) (0.365) 
Fourth tier 4.047*** 4.075*** 4.013*** 4.080*** 
 (0.299) (0.269) (0.290) (0.331) 
2002 dummy 0.938*** 0.906*** 0.933*** 0.944*** 
 (0.284) (0.276) (0.275) (0.284) 
Total liabilities/total assets (t-1) 0.0613*** 0.0639*** 0.0613*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0216) 
Net debt/revenue (t-1) 0.0723** 0.0549 0.0560 0.0723** 
 (0.0354) (0.0366) (0.0374) (0.0341) 
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Wage-performance residual t: t-1 -0.365***    
 (0.123)    
Performance-revenue residual t:t-1 -0.359    
 (0.259)    
Wage-performance residual t:t-2  -0.411***   
  (0.120)   
Performance-revenue residual t:t-2  -0.474*   
  (0.281)   
Wage-performance residual t:t-3   -0.329***  
   (0.121)  
Performance-revenue residual t:t-3   -0.203  
   (0.277)  
Wage-performance residual t:t-4    -0.269** 
    (0.110) 
Performance-revenue residual t:t-4    -0.246 
    (0.225) 
     
Constant 4.170*** 4.324*** 4.233*** 4.164*** 
 (0.279) (0.291) (0.328) (0.365) 
     
Observations 2,236 2,113 1,995 1,882 
Pseudo- R .164 2 .194 .186 .192 
F-test for joint significance of 
residuals  
11.34*** 12.92*** 7.49** 6.25** 
p-value .004 .002 .024 .044 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: Dependent variable: the Wage-Revenue ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Second tier 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0269) 
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Third tier 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.217*** 0.213*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0282) (0.0296) (0.0305) 
Fourth tier 0.240*** 0.225*** 0.220*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0303) (0.0324) (0.0343) 
 -0.0620***    
     
Wage-performance residual t:t-1 (0.00969)    
 -0.260***    
Performance-revenue residual t:t-1 (0.0226)    
  -0.0502***   
Wage-performance residual t:t-2  (0.00963)   
  -0.209***   
Performance-revenue residual t:t-2  (0.0234)   
   -0.0384***  
Wage-performance residual t:t-3   (0.00926)  
   -0.176***  
Performance-revenue residual t:t-3   (0.0230)  
    -0.0300*** 
Wage-performance residual t:t-4    (0.00913) 
    -0.145*** 
Performance-revenue residual t:t-4    (0.0228) 
     
Constant 0.578*** 0.584*** 0.592*** 0.597*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0216) 
     
Observations 2,357 2,219 2,087 1,960 
R-squared 0.250 0.243 0.232 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6: The wage/revenue ratio and the balance sheet 
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Dependent variable: Total liabilities/ 
total assets 
Net debt/revenue 
   
Wage/revenue (t-1) 0.629*** 0.447*** 
 (0.190) (0.149) 
Wage/revenue (t-2) 0.550** 0.359*** 
 (0.231) (0.116) 
Wage/revenue (t-3) 1.122*** 0.466*** 
 (0.263) (0.174) 
Wage-performance residual t:t-3 -0.0770* -0.0918*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0290) 
Performance-revenue residual t:t-3 -0.344*** -0.216*** 
 (0.130) (0.0769) 
Constant -0.276 -0.171 
 (0.299) (0.204) 
   
Observations 2,114 2,205 
R-squared 0.095 0.096 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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